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817 
THE RIGHT TO BE VIRTUALLY CLOTHED 
Peter W. Cooper 
Abstract: Nonconsensual pornography, also known as, “revenge pornography” or “cyber 
exploitation,” is the publication of a person’s nude image or video online by a third party. It 
is a privacy violation that can ruin a person’s social and professional life. Although advocates 
and lawmakers have done substantial work addressing this problem, current legal remedies 
fall short. This Comment argues that two privacy protections developed abroad, the “right to 
be forgotten” and the “right to delete,” should be applied domestically to nonconsensual 
pornography. One aspect of the “right to be forgotten,” i.e., the ability to remove 
nonconsensually posted images from search engine results, could be developed domestically 
to counter the reputational impact of revenge porn. Additionally, the “right to delete,” which 
is currently limited to the copyright context in the United States, could be expanded so that 
courts could mandate removal of images both from websites and from individuals’ 
possession once consent has been withdrawn. These rights—which together compose a right 
to control nonconsensually published nude images online—herein dubbed the “right to be 
virtually clothed”—will help address reputational and social damage as well as reduce the 
overall impact of revenge porn first by obscuring the underlying content and ultimately by 
removing it from the web. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Amanda Todd was a fifteen-year-old girl from British Columbia.
1
 
An anonymous stranger convinced her to reveal her breasts on her 
webcam.
2
 A year later, the stranger created a Facebook page with the 
picture.
3
 Amanda was harassed, bullied, and tormented, both at school 
and online.
4
 Amanda expressed her devastation in a YouTube video, 
stating, “I can never get that photo back. It’s out there forever . . . .”5 A 
few months after she made the video, Amanda took her own life.
6
 The 
permanence of such photos is a foundational aspect of nonconsensual 
pornography’s invidious nature—once content is created, there is no 
practical way, legal or otherwise, for victims to conceal or remove 
                                                     
1. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 11 (2014); see also Calvin 
Cunningham, Full Video: Amanda Todd: Struggling, Bullying, Suicide, Self Harm, Fighting, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2012), https://youtu.be/IyHX7wMJBY0 [https://perma.cc/MNW8-BVFU]. 
2. Cunningham, supra note 1. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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images.
7
 This can change. 
Nonconsensual pornography—also known as “revenge porn”—is a 
form of online harassment that causes irreparable reputational and career 
damage.
8
 Revenge porn is the nonconsensual distribution of sexually 
explicit photographs or videos online. Often the perpetrator will post an 
image along with a fake advertisement for sex and the subject’s 
individually identifiable information such as their home and work 
addresses, social media profiles, and social security numbers.
9
 
Additionally, some perpetrators will intentionally prioritize the order 
that a search engine displays nonconsensual pornography results when 
someone searches for the subject’s name.10 As a result, revenge porn can 
cause severe emotional harm, ruin careers, and place survivors
11
 in 
physical danger.
12
 
This Comment will propose three legislative measures that would 
mitigate harms associated with revenge porn. Part I describes how the 
internet promotes and extends access to content, which facilitates 
revenge porn and intensifies its damage.
13
 Part II analyzes historical and 
contemporary approaches to privacy law in the United States and gives a 
brief overview of current legal approaches to revenge porn. Part III 
advocates for recognition of a “right to be virtually clothed,” stemming 
from the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to delete” as recognized 
internationally. Specific to the revenge porn context, the “right to be 
virtually clothed” includes the right to remove nonconsensual images 
from search engine results, and the right to delete nonconsensual images 
once consent has been withdrawn—from both a website hosting the 
images and from the individual who possesses the images. Finally, Part 
                                                     
7. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345, 350 (2014) (stating that once content has been posted thousands of people can view 
and repost the content). But cf. infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
Google’s voluntary deindexing procedure). 
8. Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 352. 
9. Id. at 350–51 (“In a study of 1,244 individuals, over 50% of victims reported that their naked 
photos appeared next to their full name and social network profile; over 20% of victims reported 
that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to their naked photos.”). 
10. CITRON, supra note 1, at 67. 
11. I use the word “survivor” as opposed to “victim” throughout this Comment. See EUGENE 
MCLAUGHLIN & JOHN MUNCIE, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF CRIMINOLOGY 315 (2001) (“Feminists, 
recognizing the power of linguistics, object to the term victim because of its emphasis on passivity 
and powerlessness and prefer instead to focus on ways in which women actively resist the 
oppression of their personal and structural locations.”). 
12. See Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 350–54 (discussing revenge porn’s damage). 
13. See infra Part I; Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 350 (“The Internet provides a staggering 
means of amplification, extending the reach of content in unimaginable ways.”). 
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IV describes the potential legal challenges these proposals might face 
and ways to overcome these barriers. 
I. REVENGE PORN DESTROYS CAREERS, REPUTATIONS, 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND CAUSES PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM 
Often, the first response to revenge porn is a form of victim 
blaming
14: “don’t take nude photos or videos.”15 The logic goes, if you 
do not take pictures or videos of yourself or allow others to take them, 
then you will not have a problem. This ostensibly simple solution 
ignores the gendered nature of the problem,
16
 the reality that these 
images are being taken—and will continue to be17—and the severity of 
the effect of the non-consensual publication of nude images online. 
What happens online affects our lives offline. People who post revenge 
porn online destroy survivors’ offline reputations, job opportunities, and 
relationships, and cause psychological harm.
18
 These harms are 
intensified due to cultural norms and because the internet is easy to use 
and globally accessible.
19
 
One prominent aspect that fuels revenge porn’s harms is its cultural 
and gendered context. It is often men who instigate the initial act of 
recording and women who suffer the consequences.
20
 Danielle Citron, 
who has extensively studied revenge porn, illustrates that revenge porn 
is powerful because society gives it power: “[h]arassers know that 
women will be seen as sluts . . . [and] post women’s nude images 
                                                     
14. Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn Edition, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/adventures-in-victim-
blaming-revenge-porn-edition.html [https://perma.cc/6VUZ-V6B7] (“[G]iven that it is women who 
are primarily targeted by revenge porn, the advice is really aimed at women, and aimed specifically 
at restricting their sexual behavior.”). 
15. Eric Goldman, What Should We Do About Revenge Porn Sites Like Texxxan?, FORBES (Jan. 
28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/01/28/what-should-we-do-about-revenge-
porn-sites-like-texxxan/#74f9d4cd4177 (“[F]or individuals who would prefer not to be a revenge 
porn victim or otherwise have intimate depictions of themselves publicly disclosed, the advice will 
be simple: don’t take nude photos or videos.”). 
16. See Franks, supra note 14. 
17. Emma Barker, Cosmo Survey: 9 out of 10 Millennial Women Take Naked Photos, 
COSMOPOLITAN (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/advice/a30675/ninety-percent-millennial-women-take-
nude-photos-cosmo-survey/ [https://perma.cc/P4VE-VN8J]. 
18. CITRON, supra note 1, at 17. 
19. See CITRON, supra note 1. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet 
Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 68 (Saul Levemore 
& Martha C. Nussbaum et al. eds., 2010). 
20. See CITRON, supra note 1, at 17. 
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because they know it will make them unemployable, undateable, and at 
risk for sexual assault.”21 Although revenge is certainly a reason that 
people post revenge porn, it is not the only reason.
22
 Perpetrators may be 
motivated by money, sexual gratification, or entertainment, or have no 
particular reason.
23
 Whatever the motivation, it is no coincidence that 
ninety percent of revenge porn survivors are female.
24
 This is not to say 
that revenge porn does not affect men.
25
 Rather, revenge porn 
disproportionately affects women, both in terms of the number of 
women affected and the amount of social stigma attached. 
A second aspect is that the internet’s accessibility and ease of use 
allows “relatively powerless people [to] gain enormous power over the 
lives of particular women . . . .”26 The internet provides nearly everyone 
the opportunity to publish material anonymously and instantly. Prior to 
the internet, perpetrators were arguably more accountable because 
publicizing pictures required printing and mailing pictures; images and 
videos went as widely as they were distributed; and there was a trail by 
which to trace perpetrators.
27
 Now, people can anonymously share 
images and videos—that have major life consequences for the subject—
globally, without fear that anyone will know they were the publisher.
28
 
Moreover, revenge porn perpetrators have developed sophisticated 
ways of exploiting search engine algorithms so that employers, friends, 
and new acquaintances searching a survivor’s name will see the 
nonconsensual pornography first.
29
 This is particularly damaging 
because up to seventy percent of employers have rejected candidates 
based on data found online and seventy-five percent of employers have 
formal policies that require hiring personnel to research applicants 
                                                     
21. Id. 
22. Holly, Infographic: The Anatomy of an Effective Revenge Porn Law, END REVENGE PORN 
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.cybercivilrights.org/anatomy-effective-revenge-porn-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/TX9B-FAYU]. 
23. Id. 
24. Natalie Webb, End Revenge Porn Infographic, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE (Jan. 3, 2014), 
http://www.cybercivilrights.org/end_revenge_porn_infographic [https://perma.cc/4JRT-GFQU].  
25. Id. 
26. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 69. 
27. Id. at 79. 
28. Id. 
29. “Google bombing” causes Google’s page rank algorithm to cause certain pages or images to 
appear when searching a particular phrase, such as a survivor’s name. See Marziah Karch, What Is a 
Google Bomb, ABOUT TECH, http://google.about.com/od/g/g/googlebombdef.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JD39-QVRH] (last updated Mar. 1, 2016). 
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online.
30
 Images form first impressions that cannot be undone: “Even if 
prospective employers are clear that [potential employees] are victims 
and that the rumors are false, knowing the pornographic depictions may 
taint their view of these women, just as knowledge of a rape victim’s 
identity often colors people’s associations with her.”31 
In addition to ruining survivors’ livelihoods, revenge porn can destroy 
social aspects of survivors’ lives by engendering fear, destroying their 
ability to date, and causing feelings of embarrassment in public.
32
 
Revenge porn is also used as blackmail to keep women in abusive 
relationships or as leverage in custody negotiations.
33
 Revenge porn 
websites capitalize on this harm, by extorting survivors by making them 
pay fees to remove content as well.
34
 Given the multitude of harms that 
result from revenge porn, there is a clear need for regulation and 
effective redress for survivors. 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE DOES NOT 
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS REVENGE PORN 
A. The Right to Privacy Does Not Include the Right to Control 
Information About Oneself 
The evolution of privacy law created a system that protects certain 
privacy violations but fails to address revenge porn effectively. Revenge 
porn is, in essence, a privacy violation: images intended for a specific 
person at a specific time are publicized for the world to see. Privacy law 
evolved in a piecemeal manner, and the legal concept of privacy began 
with tort liability.
35
 Beyond tort liability, privacy evolved into an adjunct 
constitutional right.
36
 And, over the years, Congress recognized some 
pockets of privacy for certain types of information,
37
 but there is no 
                                                     
30. CROSS-TAB MKTG. SERVS., ONLINE REPUTATION IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2010), 
http://www.job-hunt.org/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-Research_overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MG2L-VTLH]. 
31. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 80. 
32. See id. 
33. Michelle Goldberg, Revenge Porn Is Malicious and Reprehensible. But Should It Be a 
Crime?, NATION (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/181829/war-against-revenge-
porn [https://perma.cc/ZSF3-B8UM]. 
34. CITRON, supra note 1, at 175 (“MyEx.com removes people’s nude photos within forty-eight 
hours after people pay them $400.”). 
35. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 10 (4th ed. 2012). 
36. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
37. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936; 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2016) (privacy of individually identifiable health information 
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general right to privacy that revenge porn survivors can invoke. 
The most profound development in privacy law in the United States 
was Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ seminal article, “The Right to 
Privacy.”38 Warren and Brandeis argued that there should be a common 
law “right to be let alone,” drawing comparisons between the right to 
privacy and property rights.
39
 Fifteen years later, Georgia became the 
first state to uphold a common law tort action for privacy invasions.
40
 In 
the years that followed, other states began to legally recognize the harms 
caused by privacy invasions through various torts.
41
 In 1960, William 
Prosser surveyed the state of existing tort law and concluded that there 
were essentially four types of privacy harms: (1) intrusion upon the 
plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity 
that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) 
appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.
42
 Although privacy law is by no means uniform across states, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts tracks Prosser’s model, and most 
states recognize some, if not all, of these torts.
43
 
The United States Supreme Court also recognizes a limited 
constitutional right to privacy.
44
 The United States Constitution, unlike 
the constitutions in some other countries, does not explicitly mention the 
right of privacy.
45
 The Court held, “the protection of a person’s general 
                                                     
covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act); 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012) 
(privacy of children’s personal information collected by websites covered by the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act); id. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (privacy of financial records covered by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
38. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); 
see also Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY 
10 (2006) (describing the evolution of privacy law). 
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38. 
40. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
41. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (1960). 
42. Id. at 389. 
43. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A–E 
(Am. Law. Inst. 1977). 
44. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding the “right of privacy” within the 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights). 
45. Compare U.S. CONST., with S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 14, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9E3-F6AY] (“Everyone has the right to privacy”), and MAGYARORSZÁG 
ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY, art. 6 (“Every person 
shall have the right to the protection of his or her private and family life, home, relations and good 
reputation . . . Every person shall have the right to the protection of his or her personal data, and to 
access and disseminate data of public interest.”). See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (“The Constitution 
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right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the 
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of 
the individual States.”46 However, the Court recognized that there are 
privacy rights embedded in the Constitution as adjunct rights that exist 
in the penumbras of other rights.
47
 That is, certain zones of privacy exist 
that are rooted in the Constitution.
48
 For example, the Court recognized 
the “privacy in one’s associations” as a corollary to the First 
Amendment,
49
 the privacy of the marital bedroom,
50
 and the privacy of 
an individual’s sexual behavior,51 as protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Outside of previously recognized 
zones—or “penumbras”—the right of privacy is limited to “personal 
rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental.’”52 
Beyond the Supreme Court’s recognition of common law and 
constitutional privacy, Congress has passed a number of federal privacy 
laws. But these laws only provide limited protection in specific contexts. 
For example, the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996
53
 (HIPAA) prohibits the disclosure of protected health 
information,
54
 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial 
institutions to safeguard sensitive financial data,
55
 and the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act provides certain levels of privacy for 
children online.
56
 Although some federal laws that prohibit the sexual 
exploitation of minors can be used to force websites to remove nude 
images of children,
57
 there are no similar protections for adults whose 
nude images have been posted online without their consent. 
                                                     
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”). 
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (emphasis in original). 
47. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
48. Id. (“In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots 
of that right in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can 
be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are included in this 
guarantee of personal privacy.” (citations omitted)). 
49. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
53. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
54. 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2016) (protecting privacy of individually identifiable health information). 
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (protecting privacy of financial records). 
56. Id. § 6501 (protecting privacy of children’s personal information collected by websites). 
57. Id. §§ 6501–6506; 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). 
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Current law is limited because it does not allow revenge porn 
survivors any control over the images that others have posted online. 
Although tort law may allow survivors to sue for public disclosure of 
private facts or the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
58
 these 
laws do not address the ongoing reputational harm caused by the images 
remaining online. Likewise, federal privacy laws do not address 
nonconsensually distributed images for adults, and federal law prevents 
states from addressing the problem.
59
 
B. Legal Avenues for Addressing Revenge Porn’s Harms Are 
Burgeoning, Yet Remain Inadequate 
Despite the legal system’s recognition of privacy harms, the remedies 
for revenge porn are inadequate.
60
 The legal system keeps most 
survivors at its gates due to the costs of litigation,
61
 the inability to 
remain anonymous in a lawsuit,
62
 and the difficulty of obtaining 
computer forensic evidence linking perpetrators to crimes.
63
 This is 
especially true given that many perpetrators are judgment proof, and the 
costs and complexity of taking on a revenge porn case are formidable.
64
 
However, those with representation have attempted to address the 
damages of revenge porn through criminal law and civil remedies, 
including copyright law and civil rights law, and by attempting to hold 
website operators accountable through various torts.
65
 The problem with 
the current criminal and civil responses to revenge porn is that they are 
slow, costly, and—in many circumstances—ultimately ineffective at 
removing the underlying content. While litigation is pending, images 
remain online, often linked to a survivor’s name, and they continue to 
affect survivors’ livelihoods, social lives, and mental well-being. 
                                                     
58. CITRON, supra note 1, at 121. 
59. See infra Part IV.A. 
60. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET, supra note 19, at 31, 32 (arguing that in many cyber crimes “[t]raditional criminal and 
tort law can reach some of [survivors’] injuries, such as the tarnished reputations, emotional distress 
caused by threats, and privacy invasions. But they fall short of a complete response because they 
fail to address the gender and race-based nature of the damage”). 
61. Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 358. 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). 
63. CITRON, supra note 1, at 84. 
64. Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET, supra note 19, at 155, 160. 
65. See CITRON, supra note 1, at 121. 
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1. Criminal Law 
Criminal law is a promising solution because it can help deter 
potential perpetrators, yet it remains unavailable to some survivors 
because not all states have passed criminal revenge porn laws. As of 
May 2016, thirty-two states had passed revenge porn specific criminal 
laws.
66
 Nine additional states had bills pending in legislation.
67
 For those 
fortunate enough to live in a state where revenge porn is a criminal act, 
these laws will likely have deterrent effects. But even if all states 
criminalize revenge porn, criminalization will not fully address the 
reputational damage revenge porn causes. In other words, incarcerating a 
person for revenge porn does not change the fact that a search engine 
will continue to perpetuate the reputational damage caused by the crime, 
nor does it remove the posted content.
68
 
In addition to revenge porn specific state criminal laws, federal 
criminal law prohibits some types of revenge porn conduct as well. For 
example, the federal stalking statute prohibits a perpetrator from 
engaging in a “course of conduct” that puts a person in reasonable fear 
of death or serious bodily injury or causes substantial emotional 
distress.
69
 But in many cases revenge porn perpetrators make no explicit 
threats, and the behavior at issue does not meet the “course of conduct”70 
required for felony stalking charges.
71
 
Although criminal laws will help by deterring perpetrators of revenge 
porn,
72
 these laws do not address the removal of the content from search 
engine results, websites, or from perpetrators. Because the content 
                                                     
66. State Revenge Porn Criminal Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG (last updated May 6, 2016), 
http://www.cagoldberglaw.com/states-with-revenge-porn-laws [https://perma.cc/532M-74JB].  
67. See id. (listing pending bills). 
68. Many advocates support, and have comprehensively addressed, laws criminalizing revenge 
porn. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 7. Although criminalization will be an important part of 
the fight against revenge porn and has been successful in other countries, this Comment will focus 
on other methods of relief for survivors and will not further discuss criminalization as a solution. 
For a further discussion of international criminalization efforts, see Alice Nutting, Revenge Porn Is 
Vile Symptom of Modern Misogyny — But We Now Have a Chance to Stamp It Out, INDEPENDENT 
(Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-vile-symptom-of-
the-misogynistic-modern-age—its-about-time-we-had-a-protection-law-9864101.html 
[http://perma.cc/VM28-AJ5A] (discussing Britain’s recent revenge porn laws).  
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
70. “The term ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2). 
71. Id. 
72. CITRON, supra note 1, at 123 (“Criminal convictions are powerful deterrents because of their 
lasting collateral consequences.”). 
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remains online and accessible through search engines worldwide, these 
laws do not remedy revenge porn’s reputational harms. In fact, several 
state criminal laws explicitly carve out immunity for website operators.
73
 
Thus, websites have no legal liability for failure to remove revenge porn 
images posted by users.
74
 Perpetrators likewise are not legally compelled 
to destroy the images at issue. Only Hawaii and North Carolina give 
courts the power to order destruction of the images pursuant to their 
revenge porn laws.
75
 However, to destroy a recording, a Hawaiian court 
must find either that the recording was nonconsensual or that the 
defendant acted with intent to harm.
76
 Similarly, for a North Carolina 
court to order the destruction of an image, the plaintiff must prove the 
perpetrator’s intent to do either of the following: 
a. Coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause 
financial loss to the depicted person. 
b. Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, 
or cause financial loss to the depicted person.
77
 
These laws grant judges the discretion to order a perpetrator to delete 
the nonconsensually recorded content,
78
 but each is limited to a showing 
                                                     
73. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.86.010(4) (2016) (“This section does not impose liability 
upon the following entities solely as a result of content provided by another person: (a) An 
interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(f)(2).”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-
190.5A(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.2(4) 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
74. This is necessary because state law to the contrary would be preempted by § 230 immunity. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
75. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“In 
addition to any penalties the court may impose, the court may order the destruction of any recording 
made in violation of this section.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.5A(e) (“In addition to any 
penalty or other damages, the court may award the destruction of any image made in violation of 
this section.”). 
76. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9(1). 
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.5A. 
78. In other states that do not grant judges the discretion to order a perpetrator to delete the 
nonconsensual content, advocates may still be able to ask the court to order a perpetrator to delete 
non-consensually recorded content as a form of equitable relief, or use injunctions to prevent 
dissemination. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.) (allowing for “[a]dditional relief the court deems necessary and proper”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 98B.004 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing a court to “issue a 
temporary restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction to restrain and prevent the 
disclosure or promotion of intimate visual material with respect to the person depicted in the 
material”). However, I am unaware of any case to date where this has been successful. There may 
also be a potential equity-based argument where a court could compel the photographer to issue a 
takedown notice under copyright law. Again, I am unaware of any case where this has been 
attempted. 
14 - Cooper.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:52 PM 
2016] THE RIGHT TO BE VIRTUALLY CLOTHED 827 
 
of intent.
79
 This means that the law does not cover the non-revenge 
situations where a perpetrator has other motivations such as money, 
sexual gratification, entertainment, or no particular reason.
80
 
In sum, twenty-eight out of fifty states have laws that criminalize 
revenge porn, and in very specific circumstances a few federal laws may 
apply to revenge porn. Although these laws, and the continued 
proliferation of these laws, will help deter revenge porn perpetrators, 
they do not halt or negate the ongoing reputational damage of revenge 
porn, once an image has been nonconsensually distributed. 
2. Civil Remedies 
Apart from criminal laws, advocates have sought relief against 
revenge porn perpetrators through civil statutes. For survivors living in 
California,
81
 Florida,
82
 North Carolina,
83
 North Dakota,
84
 Pennsylvania,
85
 
Texas,
86
 Vermont,
87
 Washington,
88
 and Wisconsin,
89
 there is the 
possibility of monetary relief beyond the potential criminal deterrence. 
However, in only three of these nine states does the law explicitly allow 
survivors to file suits while maintaining their confidentiality.
90
 
Moreover, the injunctive relief provided pursuant to these statutes (like 
most injunctive relief) often comes too late—after images have been 
posted, reposted, and shown up in search results for the survivor’s name. 
While these laws are vital—and legislators should continue to pass 
them—they are incomplete because they do not address removing 
revenge porn from search results, websites, or the person who possesses 
the material. 
Attempts to hold websites or website operators liable for failure to 
remove revenge porn have ultimately been unsuccessful because of the 
                                                     
79. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.5A(e). 
80. See supra Part I. 
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.85 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.049 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). 
83. N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 14-190.5A(g). 
84. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-58 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
85. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
86. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98B.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
87. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795 (2014). 
89. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (cross-referencing 
§ 942.09, i.e., a criminal revenge porn statute). 
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.85 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2606; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795. 
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Communications Decency Act (CDA).
91
 The CDA carves out immunity 
for website operators for user-posted content.
92
 Section 230 of the CDA, 
the “Good Samaritan” provision, states: “no provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider.”93 
This provision, combined with a preemption clause, effectively insulates 
people who host revenge porn websites from civil liability.
94
 Whoever 
posts the material on a website is treated as the “publisher,” while the 
website is like an empty news rack where users can place any content 
and display it to the world at large.
95
 Although this immunity is broad, it 
is not absolute. If a website operator “invites the posting of illegal 
materials or makes actionable postings itself,” this immunity ceases to 
exist.
96
 Practically speaking, because revenge porn is (somewhat by 
definition) user-posted content, and website operators are likely the only 
parties able to pay for a judgment, the CDA limits survivors’ ability to 
obtain monetary relief and states’ abilities to enact prophylactic 
legislation in this area.
97
 
To address the removal of revenge porn content, some survivors have 
used copyright law—to which § 230 immunity does not apply.98 But it is 
an incomplete solution that does nothing when the photographer is not 
the survivor.
99
 Copyright law protects a photographer or videographer’s 
images from publication, even when they are unpublished and 
                                                     
91. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
92. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
93. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
94. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain 
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”). 
95. Id. 
96. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (E.D. Ky. 2011) 
(citing Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008)). 
97. For a more in-depth analysis of CDA and its application to revenge porn, see Layla Goldnick, 
Note, Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation of Revenge Porn and 
Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 583, 588 (2015) 
(explaining the “history, goals, and immunity created by the CDA, examining the distinctions 
between an ‘Internet service provider’ (‘ISP’) and an ‘information content provider’ and the varying 
protection granted to each . . . [as well as] a summary of a few of the most salient suggestions for 
revisions and/or amendments to the CDA proposed by legal scholars.”). See also infra Section IV(a) 
(discussing Oregon’s successful regulation of “mugshot” photos, where § 230 was not a barrier). 
98. CITRON, supra note 1, at 172. 
99. See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422 (2014). 
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unregistered.
100
 Websites and search engines
101
 that publish or link to 
copyrighted work can be held liable unless they comply with the 
“takedown” procedures in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.102 This 
means that the photographer, under penalty of perjury, declares that he 
or she has the rights to, and does not authorize, the content displayed on 
a search engine or a website.
103
 If the search engine or website fails to 
“expeditiously . . . remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity,” it can 
be held liable for copyright infringement.
104
 
Submitting a takedown request does not guarantee that a website will 
remove content or that a search engine will expeditiously remove 
links.
105
 Revenge porn websites often ignore a user’s request to remove 
material,
106
 and some seek to exploit survivors by asking them for 
money to remove the content.
107
 Attempting to sue a website that 
publishes copyrighted material requires the survivor or his or her 
attorney to track down the people behind the websites, which is often 
extremely difficult and expensive.
108
 Proving monetary damages from 
material that survivors did not intend to be public also limits the 
effectiveness of some copyright suits.
109
 Ultimately, while copyright law 
                                                     
100. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the 
author or authors of the work.”); see also id. § 106 (describing exclusive right to reproduce works); 
Copyright in General, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE http://copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-
general.html#automatic [https://perma.cc/DBQ7-7HND] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (“Copyright 
exists from the moment the work is created.”). 
101. Websites and search engines fall under the definition of “service provider.” See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 (k)(1) (“[T]he term ‘service provider’ means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent 
or received.”). 
102. See id. § 512(c) (describing website operator liability for user-posted content and the 
requirements for an effective takedown notice). 
103. Id. § 512(c)(3). 
104. Id. § 512(d)(3). 
105. CITRON, supra note 1, at 168; Goldberg, supra note 33 (“[T]he process of getting Google to 
remove links to copyrighted material can be drawn out and unpredictable.”). 
106. CITRON, supra note 1, at 172 (“Many revenge porn sites ignore requests to remove 
infringing material because they are not worried about being sued. They know that most victims 
cannot afford to hire a lawyer to file copyright claims.”). 
107. Id. at 168. 
108. In traditional copyright cases, the damages from a breach of copyright come from the 
expected gains of marketing and selling copyrighted material, which for revenge porn survivors, is 
nothing. See In re Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“interpreting ‘actual damages’ in the context of the Copyright Act to cover only economic 
damages” (citing Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
109. Id. 
14 - Cooper.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:52 PM 
830 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:817 
 
has been useful for survivors that took the pictures or videos themselves, 
it was not designed to protect privacy,
110
 and survivors are out of luck if 
someone else took their nude photo.
111
 
III. MOVING FORWARD: A WAY TO MITIGATE REVENGE 
PORN’S HARMS 
An additional approach is needed to address the shortcomings of legal 
approaches used so far. Many scholars have argued for increased 
criminalization and availability of civil legal remedies for survivors as 
solutions to revenge porn.
112
 While these approaches are encouraging, 
and gaining traction,
113
 they remain a partial solution. To fully address 
the reputational, privacy, and blackmail harms from revenge porn, there 
needs to be a way to nullify the cause of the harm itself. In Europe, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and a court in Germany 
developed two privacy protections that should be applied in the United 
States: the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to delete.”114 By 
combining one aspect of the right to be forgotten (deindexing) and two 
aspects of the right to delete—from both 1) the private individual that 
keeps material once consent has been withdrawn, and 2) the website that 
hosts the content—the legal system could give survivors the right to be 
virtually clothed. 
A. Deindexing Is a Viable Tool for Partially Addressing Revenge 
Porn’s Harms That Should Be Codified and Expanded 
Congress should consider passing a federal deindexing law to 
alleviate some of the reputational damage associated with revenge porn. 
Deindexing occurs when a search engine removes a site from its index 
and search results.
115
 That is, when people search for a term, for 
                                                     
110. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming that “the protection 
of privacy is not a function of the copyright law”). 
111. CITRON, supra note 1, at 122. For a more complete description of how survivors can use 
copyright, see Levendowski, supra note 99. 
112. See, e.g., Taylor Linkous, It’s Time for Revenge Porn to Get a Taste of Its Own Medicine: 
An Argument for the Federal Criminalization of Revenge Porn, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2014), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i4/article14.pdf [https://perma.cc/HEC6-68B5]. 
113. See States with Revenge Porn Criminal Laws, supra note 66. 
114. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
EU:C:2014:317; Philip Oltermann, ‘Revenge Porn’ Victims Receive Boost from German Court 
Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014, 14:14 E.D.T.), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/may/22/revenge-porn-victims-boost-german-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/T8W7-KQZ3].  
115. See, e.g., Google’s Legal Blow: What ‘The Right to Be Forgotten’ Means, WALL ST. J. (May 
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instance, a survivor’s name, the search will not display certain results—
such as a revenge porn posting. In the revenge porn context, deindexing 
could, at the survivor’s request, remove links to revenge porn from 
search engine results. Deindexing is a partial solution because it does not 
remove the underlying content; it just makes the content harder to find. 
This reduces the social harm caused by revenge porn because postings 
will remain obscure to most employers, friends, and family.
116
 However, 
because the content has not been deleted, a revenge porn perpetrator 
could still send the direct link to a survivor’s friends and family. After 
deindexing, a user can still access an image or video on the web through 
a direct link. Two of the major search engines in the United States, 
Google and Bing, voluntarily adopted deindexing in the revenge porn 
context.
117
 However, not all search engines have adopted this practice 
and there is no legal remedy if a search engine refuses to consider a 
request. 
The right to deindex information from search engine results stems 
from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recognizing the 
“right to be forgotten” in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos.
118
 In Google Spain, Costeja González 
filed a complaint because when people searched his name in Google, 
they would see two twelve-year-old newspaper articles describing how 
he was forced to sell his property to pay off social security debts.
119
 The 
CJEU considered the broad privacy protections outlined in the European 
Union’s Data Protection Directive (DPD),120 and balanced González’s 
                                                     
13, 2014, 10:36 AM EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/13/what-you-need-to-know-about-
the-eu-high-court-google-ruling/; Site Removed from the Google Index, GOOGLE SUPPORT, 
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/40052?hl=en [http://perma.cc/YC7Q-LENL] (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
116. See generally The IRL Impact of Google’s New “Revenge Porn” Policy, CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE (June 23, 2015), http://www.cybercivilrights.org/the-irl-impact-of-googles-new-
revenge-porn-policy/ [https://perma.cc/57LE-E4Z5]. 
117. Stephanie Mlot, Microsoft Bing Accepting Revenge Porn Removal Requests, PC MAG. (July 
23, 2015, 8:00 AM EST), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2488308,00.asp 
[http://perma.cc/PL4U-V38M] (“A website—similar to the ‘right to be forgotten’ form used in the 
European Union—is live on support.google.com.”). 
118. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
EU:C:2014:317. 
119. Id. 
120. Directive 94/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 268) 31. The DPD commands all European Union Member 
States to “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.” See id. at 38. The DPD regulatory 
framework covers all data processed by third parties except “by a natural person in the course of 
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right to privacy (with respect to the processing of his personal data) 
against the legitimate interests of internet users potentially interested in 
having access to this information.
121
 The CJEU held that González’s 
privacy rights outweighed the legitimate interests of users having 
instantaneous access to his attachment proceedings.
122
 The CJEU further 
held that, upon request, search engines were legally obligated to remove 
links between people’s names and postings that were “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes 
of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search 
engine.”123 Removing the links in this way did not affect the underlying 
content on the website or in the newspaper.
124
 The CJEU limited its 
holding to situations where the search results interfere with an 
individual’s right to privacy and the public does not have a justified 
interest in knowing the information.
125
 
The United States should adopt a statutory right to deindex 
information, limited solely to the revenge porn context. Adopting this 
right in the United States would limit revenge porn’s harms. As 
described in Part I, if search engines did not publicize revenge porn it 
would have a more limited impact on survivors’ careers and social 
lives.
126
 The right to deindex would require a federal civil statute that (1) 
compels search engines capable of displaying revenge porn results to 
adopt a procedure for deindexing revenge porn, (2) sets timelines for 
compliance, and (3) removes the discretion of the search engine 
regarding whether to block the material—for instance, once a requestor’s 
identity has been proven. 
In the last year, a limited “right to be forgotten” has been voluntarily 
adopted in the United States by both Google and Microsoft.
127
 Revenge 
porn survivors now have the ability to ask these search engines to 
remove nude or sexually explicit images uploaded or shared without 
                                                     
purely personal or household activities,” or by the State for specified activities. See Summaries of 
EU Legislation: Protection of Personal Data, EUR LEX, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
information_society/data_protection/l14012_en.htm [https://perma.cc/W7EU-3D5E] (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2016). 
121. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶¶ 80–81. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. ¶ 94. 
124. See id. ¶ 98 (requiring only that the links be removed from the list of results, not from the 
online archive). 
125. Id. ¶¶ 98–99. 
126. Supra Part I; see also Leiter, supra note 64, at 161–62. 
127. Mlot, supra note 117117. 
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their consent.
128
 However, these practices—unlike the legal obligation to 
remove links to copyrighted material and child pornography—are 
optional.
129
 The absence of a legal right to deindex means that other 
search engines, like Yahoo, that do not have a method allowing 
survivors to report links containing their non-consensually shared 
images,
130
 are not violating the law. 
B. The Ability to Delete Content Will Help Prevent Perpetrators from 
Posting Revenge Porn and Help Survivors Remove Images That 
Perpetrators Have Already Posted 
Courts should be able to enforce the right of individuals who have 
shared their intimate images to revoke their consent and have the images 
deleted. Because deindexing does not address the actual content at issue, 
survivors should be able to invoke this “right to delete” before 
perpetrators share the nonconsensual images. A preemptory right is 
necessary because most of the time survivors are unaware that 
perpetrators have posted images online until after the fact—long after 
used have reposted, viewed, and downloaded the images.
131
 Unlike 
deindexing, this will require survivors to use the court system—which 
raises access to justice and anonymity concerns. While this is an 
imperfect solution, half-a-loaf is better than no bread. 
Germany first recognized the right to delete in the revenge porn 
context. Recognizing the time-sensitive nature of privacy in the digital 
age, a court in Germany ruled that an ex-partner had the preemptive 
right to have nude photos taken of herself deleted after the relationship 
                                                     
128. See Remove Information from Google, GOOGLE SUPPORT, 
https://support.google.com/websearch/troubleshooter/3111061?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ZT7Z-
4A7F] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (an online form for removal); Alan Sembera, How to Remove 
Personal Information on Bing, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/remove-personal-
information-bing-71991.html [https://perma.cc/DBM3-7H9B] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) 
(describing the steps to contact Bing regarding removal). 
129. Removal Policies, GOOGLE SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/ 
2744324 [http://perma.cc/3M9S-2TF3] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
130. Dear Yahoo: Please Let Revenge Porn Victims Make Link Deletion Requests, 
VICTIMS2SURVIVORS UK (Aug. 18, 2015), http://victims2survivors.co.uk/2015/08/18/dear-yahoo-
please-let-revenge-porn-victims-make-link-deletion-requests/ [https://perma.cc/HC6Q-Q5ZT]. 
131. Lulu Chang, Finally, Removing Revenge Porn from Pornhub Is Being Made Simpler, 
YAHOO NEWS, (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/finally-removing-revenge-porn-
pornhub-161535473.html [https://perma.cc/TY23-P959] (“[M]ost victims don’t realize that footage 
has been distributed until long after it first appears online. And with the rapid circulation that our 
digital age allows, attorney Elisa D’Amico notes that victims are still ‘left chasing fruit flies with a 
butterfly net.’”). 
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was over.
132
 The court found that “consent to use and own privately 
recorded nude pictures could be withdrawn by the ex-partner on the 
grounds of personal rights, which are valued higher than the ownership 
rights of the photographer.”133 Recognizing the potential harms and the 
fact that once a perpetrator posts an image or video online it can easily 
be copied, reposted, and widely distributed, the court acted 
proactively.
134
 This ruling was limited solely to nude images: “any 
pictures where the woman was fully clothed did not have to be deleted, 
as these have ‘little, if any capacity’ to compromise her, the judge said in 
a statement.”135 
In addition to removing images from the perpetrator, individuals 
should have the right to remove revenge porn from websites hosting the 
content. Imposing liability on websites that host revenge porn for failure 
to remove nonconsensual intimate images upon request would allow 
survivors to “delete” revenge porn from the web. This right to delete is 
necessary, because even if the index to a website has been removed from 
Google’s (or any search engine’s) search and ranking algorithm, this 
does not mean the content has been removed from the internet. The 
content is still accessible worldwide to anyone who has the direct link. 
Deindexing and the right to delete will likely encounter preemption 
challenges, constitutional challenges, and resistance from free speech 
advocacy groups. However, it may be possible to enforce these rights in 
a way that overcomes these barriers. It is important to advocate for these 
rights because together they would create a system that effectively 
addresses survivors’ damages. However, these solutions will require 
balancing fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. 
IV. POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING THESE 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES CAN BE OVERCOME 
To mitigate revenge porn, survivors must be able to deindex search 
                                                     
132. Oltermann, supra note 114. 
133. Id.; see also Court Orders Ex-Lovers to Delete Sexy Pics, LOCAL (May 22, 2014, 8:10 AM), 
http://www.thelocal.de/20140522/court-forces-ex-lovers-to-delete-sexy-photos 
[https://perma.cc/96EV-XQZ2] (“The Higher Regional Court of Koblenz decided in a verdict 
published on Tuesday that when a relationship finished, intimate material should be deleted - if one 
of the ex-partners asked for it to be.”). 
134. See Oltermann, supra note 114. 
135. Heather Saul, German Court Rules Ex-lovers Must Delete Explicit Photos of Partners After 
a Break-up, INDEPENDENT (May 22, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ 
german-court-rules-ex-lovers-must-delete-explicit-photos-of-partners-after-a-break-up-
9419009.html [http://perma.cc/VM28-AJ5A]. 
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results and delete compromising images and videos. There are ways to 
implement this “right to be virtually clothed” so that it does not 
transgress other rights. In addition to the constitutional concerns and 
federal barriers to state implementation of these proposed laws, the 
major challenges to implementing these solutions will likely come from 
groups that support free speech rights.
136
 However, “the First 
Amendment conversation often ignores the expressive interests of 
people who want to share intimate images with their romantic partners. 
Greater privacy protections allow people to openly express their 
personalities and values.”137 Groups concerned about the chilling effect 
on the “free speech” of those who post revenge porn should also be 
concerned about chilling the expressive interests that deregulation has 
fostered. It is ironic that free speech rights groups fight against revenge 
porn laws, because failure to act ultimately interferes with survivors’ 
rights, too. 
A. Current Federal Law Prohibits States from Granting These Rights 
Congress needs to create a federal legal right to deindex or delete that 
is enforceable against website operators because of the immunity it 
provided website operators in the Communications Decency Act. 
Section 230 of the CDA grants website operators immunity from content 
posted by users, i.e., “no provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”138 This is combined 
with a preemption clause: “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent 
with this section.”139 In short, federal law would need to be amended to 
hold website operators or search engines liable.
140
 This is important 
                                                     
136. See, e.g., Freedom of Expression: The First Amendment Ignored, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/freedom-expression-0 [https://perma.cc/D6LY-M4M7] (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016) (“The American Civil Liberties Union has been involved in virtually all of the landmark First 
Amendment cases to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, and remains absolutely committed to the 
preservation of each and every individual’s freedom of expression.”). 
137. Cynthia Barmore, Comment, Criminalization in Context: Involuntariness, Obscenity, and 
the First Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 447, 468 (2015). 
138. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
139. Id. § 230(e)(3). 
140. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 242 F. 
App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (broadly interpreting the CDA to immunize Google from the tortious acts 
of a third party through its website search tool and its caching system). A number of law review 
comments and articles discuss the need for federal legislation and the limitations of CDA immunity. 
See, e.g., Zak Franklin, Justice for Revenge Porn Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims of 
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because without liability, website operators have no reason to stop 
hosting these profitable websites.
141
 
While the CDA’s § 230 immunity typically preempts state action, in 
situations where § 230 does not apply states have been successful in 
addressing similar harms. For example, Oregon successfully outlawed 
the exploitative use of mugshot photos online in cases where the subjects 
were later exonerated.
142
 Websites exploiting mugshot photos created a 
similar situation to what many revenge porn survivors face. For 
example, mugshot websites published defamatory images then 
demanded a fee to have the images removed.
143
 Because mugshot 
websites actively collected the mugshots and hosted them, the websites 
were considered the “publishers” of the material under the CDA.144 This 
meant that Oregon could regulate them. In contrast, on revenge porn 
websites, the “publisher” is a user on the site who uploads an image. 
Because a user uploads the image, as opposed to the website itself, the 
website is protected by § 230 immunity.
145
 As with Oregon’s mugshot 
law, when § 230 immunity is not an issue, states can pass laws that 
balance “the public’s right to be informed against an individual’s right to 
not be extorted,” something states are currently preempted from doing 
for revenge porn.
146
 
B. Attempts at Federal Legislation and Revocation of § 230 Immunity 
Will Meet Resistance 
Because privacy interests can conflict with First Amendment 
                                                     
Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1303 (2014); Emily 
Poole, Comment, Fighting Back Against Non-Consensual Pornography, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 181, 187 
(2015). 
141. See Franklin, supra note 140, at 1307–08 (“The original revenge porn website, ‘Is Anyone 
Up?,’ is estimated to have grossed up to $20,000 a month.”). 
142. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.806 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
143. See Poole, supra note 140, at 188 (2015) (describing how a revenge porn operator made 
thousands of dollars from removal fees). In fact, these issues were so similar in nature that Vermont 
decided to address them at the same time. See, e.g., 2015 Vt. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (“An act relating 
to disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent, charging fees for removing booking 
photographs from the Internet . . . .”). 
144. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
145. Id. (stating that websites will not be treated as the publisher of material posted by others, and 
preempting liability under state law). 
146. See Christian Gaston, John Kitzhaber to Sign Oregon Law Regulating Mug Shot Web Sites, 
OREGONIAN (July 29, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/ 
2013/07/john_kitzhaber_to_sign_oregon.html [https://perma.cc/D8DZ-DR7L] (quoting defense 
attorney advocate regarding the mug shot law). 
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concerns, addressing revenge porn has been an uphill battle.
147
 Free 
speech groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have 
helped challenge state attempts to criminalize revenge porn and have 
argued against federal criminalization.
148
 In addition, groups like the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation tout § 230 of the CDA as “one of the 
most valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation 
on the internet.”149 While these positions have merit—and striking a 
balance with the law will be difficult—the current legal landscape in the 
United States allows the First Amendment free rein online at the expense 
of unrestricted revenge pornography. 
Free speech advocacy groups have been responsible for narrowing the 
scope and severity of criminal revenge porn laws. In Florida, an ACLU 
spokesperson explained the group’s rationale, saying, “you can’t create 
new exceptions to the First Amendment for every awful idea that people 
come up with. If it’s too broad, it can make criminals of lots of people, 
even people behaving innocently.”150 He also noted that the ACLU 
would be more comfortable if the law had a more limited scope, that is, 
if it required proof of intent to cause harm.
151
 In California, the ACLU 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation argued against California’s law 
criminalizing revenge porn.
152
 The ACLU also helped overturn 
Arizona’s criminal law.153 Arizona made it a felony to “intentionally 
disclose, display, distribute, publish, advertise, or offer a photograph, 
                                                     
147.  Many advocacy groups opposed initial legislation attempts. For example, free speech 
advocacy groups like Article 19 cautioned against criminalization. See Gabrielle Guillemin, 
Revenge Porn: All Your Questions Answered, ARTICLE 19 (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/168/view/ [https://perma.cc/55LS-GMK3]. 
148. See, e.g., Antigone Books L.L.C. v. Brnovich, No. 2:14-CV-02100-SRB (D. Ariz. July 10, 
2015); Peter Rugg, An ACLU Lawyer’s Free-Speech Argument Against Federal Revenge Porn 
Laws, INVERSE (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.inverse.com/article/5379-an-aclu-lawyer-s-free-
speech-argument-against-federal-revenge-porn-laws [https://perma.cc/292U-ECJQ]. 
149. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/4HLS-Y3CY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
150.  Rick Stone, In Florida, ‘Revenge Porn’ Is a Moving Target, WLRN (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:56 
AM), http://wlrn.org/post/florida-revenge-porn-moving-target [https://perma.cc/29ZL-22SM]. 
151. Id. 
152. See Anne Flaherty, Revenge Porn Victims Pursue New Laws, But ACLU Urges Caution, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 16, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/11/16/revenge-
porn-victims-press-for-new-laws/cXQNeLzOcy7oSDTUh3W5fK/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/P5RH-KMKU] (explaining that members of the ACLU and EFF believe these 
laws risk becoming an overly broad criminalization of speech). 
153. Final Decree at 2, Antigone Books, No. 2:14-CV-02100-SRB, http://mediacoalition.org/files/ 
litigation/antigone-books-brnovich-final-decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7TW-52XT] (“Defendants 
are permanently enjoined from enforcing, threatening to enforce, or otherwise using Arizona 
Revised Statute § 13-1425 in its current form.”). 
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videotape, film or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity 
or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows or should 
have known that the depicted person has not consented to the 
disclosure.”154 Because the scope of the illegal activity was too broad—
for example, it did not “include exceptions for photos that [were] 
newsworthy or artistic” and did not require that the subject was harmed 
because of the conduct—the law was widely critiqued, and eventually 
overturned.
155
 
Free speech advocacy groups are protective of § 230 immunity 
because “CDA 230 makes the U.S. a safe haven for websites that want 
to provide a platform for controversial or political speech and a legal 
environment favorable to free expression.”156 Although website operator 
immunity has allowed free speech to flourish, there are two sides to this 
coin. With near-absolute protection under the CDA, website operators 
have little to no accountability. Revenge porn is only one example of the 
noxious online behavior that near total immunity has allowed.
157
 
Some free speech advocates argue that because there is no way to 
objectively determine what speech has value, we should allow all 
negative and harmful speech so as not to quell the freedom of 
expression.
158
 Although this position may have some merit, it is not 
consistent with the current legal approach in the United States. 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that certain 
speech acts are outside of First Amendment protections because they are 
inherently harmful and dangerous.
159
 Here too, the Court needs to 
recognize revenge porn’s inherent harm and recognize that the First 
Amendment does not protect revenge porn. 
                                                     
154. Ariz. H.B. 2515, 51st Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (2014), invalidated by Antigone Books L.L.C. v. 
Brnovich, No. 2:14-CV-02100-SRB (D. Ariz. July 10, 2015). 
155. Steven Nelson, Arizona Law Makes Bathtub Baby Photos a Felony (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:52 PM 
EDT), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/24/larizona-revenge-porn-law-bathtub-baby-
photos-felony [https://perma.cc/B8F5-MRYH]; see Final Decree, supra note 153. Arizona has an 
updated amended version of this statute that has not been invalidated. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
1425 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d. Reg. Sess.). 
156. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, supra note 149. 
157. See Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 73–74 (detailing some of the harassment, hate speech, and 
socially destructive behavior that occurs online). 
158. See, e.g., Issues, Freedom of Speech, LIBERTARIAN, https://www.lp.org/issues/freedom-of-
speech [https://perma.cc/C8CR-JR22]. 
159. For example, “true threats” are not protected as a First Amendment right. See generally 
Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
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C. Enacting These Rights Will Require Balancing First Amendment 
Concerns 
The First Amendment does not render these steps to create a right to 
be virtually clothed unconstitutional. The First Amendment requires that 
courts balance free speech against the right to privacy.
160
 While this 
Comment does not seek to address fully the nuances of the First 
Amendment challenges at issue, it will briefly describe how First 
Amendment theory applies to deindexing, deleting content from 
websites, and requiring individuals to destroy revenge porn. Finally, to 
balance these new rights successfully with free speech rights, it is 
important to consider potential First Amendment restraints when 
drafting these laws. This means that laws should carefully incentivize 
companies and website operators by providing limited liability, and 
confine the right to be virtually clothed to the revenge porn context. 
Revenge porn is not likely protected speech.
161
 Laws that infringe on 
the First Amendment are subject to strict scrutiny, unless the speech at 
issue is categorically unprotected.
162
 This means that when the 
government regulates speech, it must have a compelling interest and 
narrowly tailor the regulation to that interest.
163
 Obscene speech is 
categorically unprotected and laws that regulate obscene content are 
only subject to rational basis review.
164
 To determine whether material is 
obscene, courts look to Miller v. California.
165
 Miller sets out a two-part 
test for whether material meets the legal definition of obscene.
166
 The 
Miller test asks whether the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex, portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way, and whether there is literary artistic, political, or scientific value in 
the material.
167
 
                                                     
160. See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624 (1982) 
(“Once it is acknowledged that the free speech interest must give way in such a situation to a 
competing social interest, acceptance of at least some form of balancing process is established.”). 
161. See Adrienne N. Kitchen, Note, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn, 90 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 247, 277 (2015). 
162. See Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1989). 
163. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1942). 
164. Id. at 754. 
165. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 (discussing the 
Miller standard). 
166. Id. at 24. 
167. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DOC. NO. 
112-9 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES—ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1302 
(Kenneth R. Thomas et al. eds., 2013). 
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Courts applying this test will likely conclude that most revenge porn 
is obscene. Per the test, the trier of fact applies the standard of the local 
community where the court sits.
168
 Patently offensive representations 
include ultimate sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd 
exhibition of the genitals.
169
 These are exactly the kind of images that 
are used in revenge porn and those most likely to cause reputational 
damage. The value prong of the test asks whether a reasonable person 
would find literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in the 
material.
170
 It is difficult to conceive of a local community that would 
find value in revenge pornography. 
1. Deindexing Does Not Transgress the First Amendment 
There is no doubt that laws that allow people to deindex or delete 
information about themselves could be subject to abuse. For example, a 
few months after the CJEU decided Google Spain, a musician sought to 
remove a tepid review from the Washington Post citing the right to be 
forgotten.
171
 This is concerning because an overly broad “right to be 
forgotten” could be used to suppress free speech. People may want to 
know whether or not to go see a particular pianist; although the 
information is negative to the performer, it serves a useful purpose and 
has value. But potential for abuse should not be an impediment to 
progress. Courts in the United States have historically understood that 
“certain degrees of harm can override the value of free speech,”172 and 
revenge porn constitutes a case where this axiom holds true. 
One way to enforce a deindexing law in the United States would be to 
emulate the way the “right to be forgotten” works in Europe. One 
suggestion is to set up a “panel of neutral arbitrators who would evaluate 
claims by private individuals that Google is returning search results that 
might constitute tortious or dignitary harms.”173 Once a revenge porn 
survivor demonstrates his or her identity and attests to the nonconsensual 
nature of the publication, he or she could petition to no longer associate 
                                                     
168. See id. at 1302 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). 
169. Id. at 1303. 
170. Id. at 1302. 
171. Caitlin Dewey, Pianist Asks the Washington Post to Remove a Concert Review Under the 
E.U.’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/10/31/pianist-asks-the-washington-
post-to-remove-a-concert-review-under-the-e-u-s-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling/ 
[https://perma.cc/AL8R-6UAM]. 
172. Leiter, supra note 64, at 163. 
173. Id. at 170 (emphasis in original). 
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his or her name with the search results. This is similar to the way Google 
has begun to comply with the CJEU’s enforcement of the “right to be 
forgotten.” Specifically, “search engines make the initial decision about 
whether to remove links after people submit their requests. If individuals 
disagree with the decisions, the data regulators in European countries 
step in to judge the merits of each case.”174 In the United States, the 
“right to be forgotten” could similarly be limited both in scope and in 
context so that it is only available to revenge porn survivors. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of deindexing, but 
precedent suggests that a law requiring deindexing is constitutional. In 
United States v. American Library Association,
175
 the Court upheld a 
federal law that conditioned federal assistance to libraries on the 
installation of software “to block images that constitute obscenity or 
child pornography, and to prevent minors from obtaining access to 
material that is harmful to them.”176 A four justice plurality held that 
strict scrutiny did not apply to the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CIPA), a law aimed specifically at “the problems associated with the 
availability of Internet pornography in public libraries.”177 The Court 
overturned the lower court’s holding that the filtering software was a 
content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny.
178
 Further, the Court 
found that even if the software had a tendency to overblock—that is 
block access to constitutionally protected speech—it would still be 
permissible because CIPA authorized a librarian to disable filters.
179
 
Similarly, if Congress were to pass a law mandating deindexing, the 
Court would likely uphold the law against a constitutional challenge. 
Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, if a law is tailored to filtering 
revenge porn and the only content that search engines filter comes from 
user requests, the filter is unlikely to be overly broad. Like software used 
to block images, filtering nonconsensual images from showing up with 
the search results of a person’s name is a valid constitutional exercise of 
power. It is more limited than CIPA, which targeted internet 
pornography in general, and it regulates the conduct of private 
                                                     
174. Mark Scott, Discussing Online ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ Google Takes European Privacy 
Tour to Spain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/ 
discussing-online-right-to-be-forgotten-google-takes-european-privacy-tour-to-spain/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/HD8N-GLLF]. 
175. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
176. Id. at 199. 
177. Id. at 198. 
178. Id. at 202–03. 
179. Id. at 208. 
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companies through private actors. 
Even if a deindexing law were subject to strict scrutiny, a court could 
similarly uphold the law. The government has a compelling interest in 
restricting revenge pornography.
180
 The law should be narrowly tailored 
to restricting revenge porn images, as opposed to pornography in 
general. By restricting the top twenty search engines capable of 
displaying revenge porn results from displaying results connected to 
particular users, the law would not create a constitutionally 
impermissible barrier, even if a court considered revenge porn protected 
speech. Like the librarian in American Library Association, there would 
still be ways to get around the filter. The only potential free speech 
interest remaining would be the right of a person seeking access to this 
information, using their preferred search engine, to see the 
nonconsensual nude images associated with another person’s name. 
Even under a liberal interpretation of the First Amendment, this interest 
is unlikely to carry much weight, especially because, post-deindexing, 
this information could still be accessed in other ways. 
2. Extending Copyright Protection to Survivors Who Did Not Create 
the Images or Removing § 230 Immunity Is Constitutional 
While this Comment is primarily concerned with deindexing, this 
procedure does not remove the content from websites. Compelling 
website operators to remove images from websites can be constitutional. 
As mentioned previously, copyright law already holds website operators 
liable for refusing to comply with takedown requests of copyrighted 
material.
181
 Similarly, federal legislation can impose liability on website 
operators because federal laws are not subject to § 230 immunity.
182
 
Congress should extend this right to revenge porn. In the existing 
literature, two proposals seem the most probable: (1) Congress could 
extend the concept of “joint authorship” to survivors who allowed 
themselves to be filmed or photographed,
183
 or (2) Congress could 
narrow the scope of § 230’s immunity so that it would not protect 
revenge porn site operators and create a “takedown remedy” for revenge 
porn posts at the federal level.
184
 Both Derek Bambauer and Danielle 
                                                     
180. See supra Section IV.C. 
181. See supra Section IV.A. 
182. This is because § 230 immunity comes from a federal law. See supra Section IV.A. 
183. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014). 
184. CITRON, supra note 1, at 172 (discussing the possibility of adding a takedown remedy to the 
federal cyber stalking statute which would be outside of § 230’s reach). 
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Citron explore these proposals in-depth in their respective works,
185
 but 
it is worth mentioning why the proposals are constitutional. 
There is no First Amendment right to post another person’s 
copyrighted material, and website operators are liable for user-posted 
content if they fail to comply with a valid take down notification.
186
 
Although “some restriction on expression is the inherent and intended 
effect of every grant of copyright,” it is likely that a limited extension of 
copyright protection to revenge porn survivors would be 
constitutional.
187
 Because the issue involves two private parties—as 
opposed to the government’s regulation of a private party’s speech—the 
First Amendment does not prohibit this type of civil remedy. “Congress 
may apparently extend and expand copyright law as it wishes, without 
giving rise to First Amendment scrutiny, so long as it leaves the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense ‘undisturbed.’”188 
Additionally, § 230’s immunity is a federal statutory right, not a 
constitutional right. Congress may pass a law amending § 230 at any 
time. Either remedy would place considerable financial pressure on 
websites to delete liability-inducing content. 
3. Compelling Private Parties to Delete Revenge Porn Could Be 
Constitutional 
A limited civil right to compel private parties to delete nonconsensual 
pornography will likely face greater challenges, yet is still permissible if 
it involves a dispute between private parties as opposed to a broad 
governmental restriction. A law that allows the government to compel a 
private citizen to delete all forms of obscenity is unconstitutional.
189
 But 
the right to be virtually clothed could require only that the private party 
delete photos requested by the subject herself, in court, after consent has 
been revoked. Applied against private individuals, the rights should 
involve a court process—where the plaintiff may use a confidential 
identity in relation to the action—and a judge can balance the personal 
rights of the parties before making a determination that the material must 
                                                     
185. See Bambauer, supra note 183; CITRON, supra note 1, at 167–89. 
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) (describing website operator liability for user-posted content 
and the requirements for an effective takedown notice); CITRON, supra note 1, at 172 (“Section 230 
does not immunize site operators from copyright claims.”). 
187. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012); Neil W. Netanel, First 
Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1102 (2013). 
188. See Netanel, supra note 187, at 1102. 
189. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), abrogated by Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 
(1990). 
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be deleted.
190
 
Although the First Amendment limits the government’s ability to 
outlaw the private possession of obscene materials,
191
 this limit is not 
absolute.
192
 When the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding its 
citizen’s physical and psychological well-being, it may outlaw the 
distribution and private possession of obscene materials.
193
 For example, 
in Osborne v. Ohio,
194
 the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio law 
proscribing the possession and viewing of child pornography. The Court 
found that the State had an important interest in protecting the survivors 
of child pornography.
195
 In doing so, the Court overturned its previous 
statement in Stanley that although “the States retain broad power to 
regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere 
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”196 
The Court upheld the individual’s limited privacy interest in Stanley 
because the government could not show that the “right to protect the 
individual’s mind from the effects of obscenity” was a compelling 
government interest.
197
 Nor, in that case, could the State of Georgia 
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in its assertion that 
obscene materials may incite a person to engage in antisocial conduct.
198
 
Additionally, the Court in Osborne later distinguished Stanley because 
the punishment of possession was not necessary to punish distribution, 
and there was little danger that private possession would give rise to the 
objections underlying a proscription upon public dissemination—
exposure to children and unwilling adults.
199
 
Unlike in Stanley, the States have a compelling interest in protecting 
its citizens from the damage revenge porn creates. Here, the Court could 
find that the grievous privacy violations, extortion, blackmail, and 
                                                     
190. A judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures that the final restraint on 
freedom of expression is constitutional. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 
363, 367 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
191. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he mere private possession of obscene matter cannot 
constitutionally be made a crime.”). 
192. In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court limited the holding in Stanley. See Osborne, 495 
U.S. at 108 (“Stanley should not be read too broadly.”). 
193. See id. (unanimously upholding New York’s law forbidding the private possession of child 
pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1942). 
194. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
195. Id. at 108. 
196. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. 
197. Id. at 565. 
198. Id. at 566–67. 
199. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 167, at 1305. 
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stigma associated with revenge porn, are enough to uphold a law against 
constitutional challenges. This constitutes a more compelling interest 
than the “right to protect the individual’s mind” Georgia tried to promote 
in Stanley. Similar to the compelling interest in Osborne, compelled 
deletion of revenge porn—pre-publication—may be the only way to 
eliminate the difficulty of trying to control content once it has been 
posted.
200
 
Congress
201
 will likely be able to draft prophylactic legislation that 
gives survivors a way to compel deletion of the underlying content. This 
could be done without transgressing the First Amendment—especially in 
cases of blackmail or where the perpetrator threatens to disclose 
material. 
CONCLUSION 
Revenge porn creates particularly harmful reputational damage for 
survivors that current legal remedies do not adequately address. While 
revenge porn specific civil remedies will help survivors seek monetary 
relief, and criminal laws will help deter potential perpetrators, neither of 
these solutions address the underlying content. Some advocates have 
successfully used copyright law to address this deficiency, but copyright 
law is useful only if the survivor takes the photograph or video herself. 
A prominent aspect that fuels revenge porn’s reputational damage is 
the link between a survivor’s name and the image in a search engine 
result. Recognizing this need, Congress should consider enacting 
legislation that requires search engines to deindex nonconsensual 
pornography. In addition, to address the content published on websites, 
scholars have proposed expanding copyright and narrowing the scope of 
the CDA’s broad immunities. This will allow survivors fortunate enough 
to procure legal representation a legal avenue to compel websites to 
remove nonconsensually posted content. Narrowing the scope of the 
CDA’s immunity would also allow states to craft legislation to regulate 
website operators and force them to remove content—as was done with 
“mugshot photos” in Oregon. Finally, survivors should have the right to 
compel private parties to delete images, once survivors revoke their 
consent, and before it can be posted online. 
Ultimately, implementing the right to be virtually clothed will require 
Congress to act. While this will be a considerable challenge—and there 
remain a number of challenges yet to be addressed—there is hope that 
                                                     
200. See Chang, supra note 131. 
201. Or the states, if § 230 immunity has been removed for revenge porn websites. 
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the tide is turning. From October 2014 to May 2016, seventeen 
additional states passed criminal laws banning revenge porn, nine more 
have legislation pending, and two of the world’s most popular search 
engines voluntarily adopted deindexing—helping to diminish revenge 
porn’s impact. 
 
